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In this paper we study the detenninants of  Effective Corporate Tax Rates (ETR) of  large 
Belgian  finns.  Our  empirical  model  to  explain  finn  level  heterogeneity  in  ETRs, 
includes finn characteristics, sector membership,  variables capturing legal tax breaks 
and location variables.  Our results can be  summarized as  follows.  First,  we  find  the 
average  Effective Tax Rate to  be  around 26% in the  period  1993-2002,  whereas the 
country wide Statutory Tax Rate (STR) in that period was 40.17 %.  Second, we  find 
that highly leveraged finns and R&D intensive finns have substantially lower Effective 
tax  rates.  Third,  we  observe  substantial  sector  level  heterogeneity  in  corporate  tax 
burdens.  Fourth,  our findings  are  indicative of regional  tax differences  with a lower 
average ETR in Wallonia. And finally, we observe that finn level Effective Tax Rates 
have increased in recent years. 
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Abstract (Nederlands) 
In deze  paper tonen we  aan dat de feitelijke  belastingdruk verschilt van  de  officiiile 
belastingvoet voar wat betreft de vennootschapsbelasting. Waar de officiele aanslagvoet 
voor grote Belgische firma's, 40.17% bedroeg tot voar 2003, vinden we  op basis van 
een steekproefvan meer dan 12,000 firma's, dat de gemiddeldefeitelijke belastingdruk 
gedurende die  peri  ode gelijk is  aan 26%.  Bet verschil tussen die  twee aanslagvoeten 
geeft weer in welke mate er sprake is van legale of onderhandelde tax faciliteiten voor 
individuele  bedrijven.  Terwijl  de  officiele  aanslagvoet  in  2002  verlaagd  werd  tot 
33.99%, observeren we in de periode die voorafgaat (1993-2002) een gestadige stijging 
van  de  feitelijke  belastingdruk  op  firma-niveau,  met  name  in  de  laatste  legislatuur 
(1999-2002). Bier kan sprake zijn van een anticipatie-effect waarbij de overheid ervoor 
gekozen heeft om de  belastbare basis te  vergroten in de  peri  ode die  de  daling van de 
officiele belastingvoet voorafging, zodat het effect op het budget min of meer neutraal 
zou blijven. Onze resultaten wijzen eveneens in de richting van een lagere gemiddelde 
belastingdruk voor firma's in Wallonie dan in Vlaanderen, wat kan wijzen op regionale 
tax  concurrentie  die  vermoedelijk  ge'inspireerd  is  door  de  sterk  verschillende 
economische situatie van beide regio's. 3 
1. Introduction 
Closer economic integration in the EU has increased capital mobility and is considered 
responsible for  the  greater tax competition between countries. It has  been argued by 
some that this capital mobility will lead to a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates as 
countries compete with each other to attract firms (European Commission, 1998). To do 
so, governments have several tools at their disposal. They can either lower the statutory 
tax rate (STR), or they can narrow the tax base for all firms by making more expenses 
deductible which lowers profit and hence lowers the taxes due.  However, governments 
may also target specific companies or sectors and offer them a preferential tax treatment 
or specific tax incentives (e.g., investment credits or tax holidays for foreign investors). 
Alternatively, they may also decide to alter the  frequency and intensity of tax audits. 
More intensive tax auditing will make firms more cautious in declaring expenses which 
increases the tax base and raise the amount of  taxes they pay. This would show up in the 
Effective  Tax Rate  (ETR)  which as  opposed to  the  Statutory Tax Rate  (STR),  also 
accounts for the tax base.  As we will explain below, the difference between the STR 
and the ETR is a reflection of  the number of  tax facilities a country provides. 
In  this paper we  analyze the determinants of firm level Effective tax rates (ETR) for 
large Belgian firms. While the Statutory tax rate is the same for all these firms, there is a 
lot of heterogeneity in Effective tax rates.!  Our analysis indicates that while legal tax 
facilities explain some of  the variation in Effective tax rates, a large part of  the variation 
can be attributed to other more political factors, such as the size if a firm and the region 
it is located in.  Sector membership and the political coalition of the federal government 
in office also tum out to be important factors in explaining the heterogeneity in ETRs. 
These  more  political  factors  could  reflect  either  negotiated  tax  facilities  or  certain 
political and economical objectives that a government is aiming to achieve through its 
tax system. 
We find an average ETR of about 26%, which is 14% lower than the STR of  40.17% in 
that  same period.  While  the  STR did not  change  in the  period we  analyze,  we  do 
observe yearly changes in average ETRs. Our results suggest that the average ETR has 
steadily increased in the course of the nineties. One potential explanation for this could 
1 A few other studies in have analyzed firm level ETRs using  different data sets such as  Buijink et al. 
(2002),  Huizinga and Nicodeme (2003 ). 4 
be that the government anticipated the  strong reduction in STR it carried through in 
December 2002.2 By widening the tax base in the years before that reduction, the effect 
on the country's budget is more offset and the reduction of the STR does not have such 
a  big  impact  on the  budget  as  it  otherwise  may  have  had.  Hence,  our  results  of 
increasing ETRs, especially at the end of  the nineties, may pick up an anticipatory effect 
of  the decrease in the STR in 2002.3 
Thus far the issue of regional tax competition within a country has not been studied in 
the  literature  before.  Although it is  clear that in many countries  in  Europe,  regions 
within a country can differ substantially in terms of their economic development and 
attractiveness to firms.  Belgium is a typical example of a country where the economic 
situation of its  3 regions is very different. While its 3 regions Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels are relatively autonomous politically, their fiscal  policy is  still very much a 
federal  issue.  However, with an average unemployment rate of about 8% in Flanders 
compared to about 14% in Wallonia, the demand for  an autonomous  fiscal  policy is 
growing.  In  a  wider  European  context,  economists  have  been  arguing  that  more 
peripheral countries like Greece and Portugal for example should be allowed to charge a 
lower corporate tax rate in order to differentiate themselves from the 'core' countries in 
Europe for the purpose of attracting firms within their country borders. This argument 
rests on the notion that firms in the core countries are more willing to pay higher taxes 
in return for better infrastructure, proximity to consumer markets, to  suppliers and to 
other firms  to benefit from agglomeration spillovers Baldwin &  Krugman (2002)  for 
example have shown that tax revenue over country GDP has not converged in Europe 
between the so called 'core' and 'periphery' countries. 
In this paper we examine whether within a country like Belgium with large economic 
disparities between its regions,4 there is any evidence of  regional tax competition where 
2 Belgium recently lowered its STR from 40.17% to 33.9% from the year 2003  onwards. Many other EU 
countries have also lowered their STR. For example the STR of Italy was reduced from 52.20% in 1993 
to 40.25% in 2002. For Denmark the STR decreased from 36% in 1993 to 30% in 2002 (KPMG, 2003). 
3 Devereux et al.  (2002) also find that tax-cutting and base-broadening reforms usually go hand in hand 
leaving the effective tax rates fairly stable over time. 
4  There are many other countries in Europe that consist of regions with very different economic growth 
rates i.e. Italy, Germany and the UK amongst others. 5 
the  expectation would be that the  more peripheral region of Wallonia would have  a 
lower Effective tax rate than the 'core' region Flanders. 
From a legal point of view,  firms  in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels in principle are 
subject to the same STR and the same rules for the determination of the tax base apply. 
However, tax audits and controls are decentralized. Hence, one potential explanation for 
observing regional differences in ETRs could stem from the intensity of tax audits or 
controls which could be less strict in the Southern part of the country. Higher regional 
unemployment rate in Wallonia puts this region in a weaker bargaining position vis-a-
vis foreign investors and domestic firms.  This could result in a less stricter application 
of the  rules  by  the  controlling  tax authorities,  which may result in  relatively  lower 
effective tax rates for firms located in the Walloon region. Our empirical results indeed 
suggest lower ETRs in Wallonia, compared to  Flanders after controlling for  sectorial 
composition and firm characteristics. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section gives an overview 
of related literature of the relevant legal and accounting aspects of Belgian corporate 
taxation. The collection and analysis of the data is discussed in Section 3.  In section 4 
we show some descriptive statistics. In section 5 we introduce the empirical model and 
in Section 6 we discuss the main results. Section 7 consists of some robustness checks. 
The last section concludes and summarizes the main results. 
2. Legal Framework 
In this section we explain how the determinants of the legal tax base and the legal tax 
facilities that applied in our period of investigation 1993-2002. The corporate income 
tax system in Belgium has  a stepwise progressive tax rate  system with rates ranging 
from 28% up to 40.17%.5 All Belgian firms in our sample are large firms subject to the 
highest STR. 
While we do  not observe the tax base in our data, we  do  observe the yearly reported 
income/profits by each firm,  which is taken by the tax authorities as  the starting point 
for determining the tax base. The legal tax base is determined as follows. First, from the 
annual income/profit figures that firms report, the tax authority can reject a number of 
5 All the fInns in our sample have reported income/profIts over 89,500 € which makes them subject to the 
highest STR. 6 
expenses, which are not deemed to be true expenses of the period. This would enlarge 
the tax base. Secondly, firms can get a tax facility for dividends received from affiliated 
firms in other European Union countries to avoid double taxation of dividend income.6 
Thirdly, they can get a tax break for losses reported in the past (,carry-forwards'). 7 And 
finally,  tax  facilities  are  also  granted  for  four  types  of investments:  investments  in 
patents,  investments  in  Research  &  Development,  investments  in  energy-savmg 
technology  and  investments  in  the  recycling  of wrapping  materials.8  The  extent  to 
which expenses are rejected by the tax authority, as well some of the legal or negotiated 
tax facilities a company enjoys can not be observed in our data. However, we do know 
the total 'tax expenses' the firm owes to the tax authority. A generally accepted way of 
measuring the  Effective tax rate (ETR) is by relating the firm level 'Tax expenses' to 
the 'reported profits (Buijinck et al 2002). The extent to which the ETR differs from the 
STR is indicative of how the tax base relates to the reported profits before taxes in our 
company accounts  data.  If the  Effective rate  lies  below the  Statutory rate,  which on 
average is  the  case,  the  tax base  is  smaller than the  reported earnings  and the  firm 
enjoys legal or negotiated tax facilities. 
3. Data 
We use  a rich panel dataset of 12,197  large  Belgian firms  over a period of 9 years 
running from  1993-2002, which result in more than 100,000 observations. These data 
were obtained from a commercial database BELFIRST which contains the population of 
Belgian  firms.  We  excluded  very  small  firms  because  their  legal  public  reporting 
requirement is lower and some variables required for our analysis were not reported by 
them.  We  did not include  financial  institutions  like  banks  and  insurance  companies, 
because they are subject to a different set of accounting rules and reporting standards. 
6  When dividends come  from associated finns within Europe,  95%  of the  dividend revenue  is  free  of 
Belgian corporate tax. For revenues from affiliates outside the EU, no tax exemption is granted. 
7 The taxable income may be reduced with the losses of the previous periods. In Belgium only losses can 
be deducted from future  profits,  this  is  called carry-forward of losses (Vankerckhove  and Heirewegh, 
2003). 
8 For the period we analyse (1993-2002), the tax facility for each of these investments was 13.5% on the 
cost of  the investment. 7 
Our analysis is based on unconsolidated company accounts9 and we only consider ETR 
observations between 0 and 1 to control for outliers as in Collins &  Shackelford (2002). 
Our sample consists of firms in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. 
The regional composition of our data is as follows: 22.5% of  the firms in our sample are 
located in Brussels, 16% in Wallonia and 61 % of the firms is located in Flanders. The 
regional composition of our sample reflects the regional composition of the population 
of  firms making our sample truly representative. 
While the BELFIRST data set contains data for the years 1989 to 2002, the availability 
varies between years. Especially, the availability of  data for the years 1989-1992 is very 
limited. Therefore, we decided to focus on the period 1993-2002 for our analysis. 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
In the  literature  the  Effective  Tax  Rate  (ETR)  is  referred to  as  a  micro  backward-
looking measure of corporate tax pressure (Devereux et al.  2002). This variable will be 
our dependent variable in the regression analysis in the next section.  Table  1 presents 
some descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation) for the ETR per region. 
A first observation is that while the  ETR for large Belgian firms  is  26%,  the median 
ETR is somewhat higher and lies around 29%. A study of Buijink et al.  (2002) finds an 
average ETR for Belgium of 21.64%, which is  pretty similar to  our findings.  Second, 
while in principle all large Belgian firms are subject to the same Statutory tax rate, the 
standard errors in Table 1 indicate that there seems to be a lot of firm heterogeneity in 
ETRs. 
Table 1: Average Effective Tax Rates by Region 
ETRI  Flanders  Wallonia  Brussels  Total 
Mean  0.2699  0.2594  0.2402  0.2615 
median  0.3239  0.2767  0.1579  0.2917 
std. dev.  0.2537  0.2467  0.2583  0.2464 
N° observations  58,816  15,406  21,546  95,768 
9 The Tax authority uses the unconsolidated accounts for determining the amount of corporate tax a firm 
has to pay  (Plateau and Van Herck, 1996). 8 
Also, on the basis of  Table 1 we would be inclined to conclude that the average ETR in 
Wallonia and Brussels is somewhat lower than for Flanders. In the regression analysis 
in section 6,  we will test for significant differences in ETRs between regions in a more 
formal way. 
Figure  1  gives  an  overVIew  of how  the  average  ETRs  per Nace-Bel  2-digit  level 
sector. IO  The bold vertical line in Figure  1 represents the  overall average ETR across 
sectors. It becomes clear that sectors like tourism (hotels), recycling and Research and 
Development (R&D) have below average Effective tax rates, while sectors like Tobacco 
has a higher than average rate. 
Figure 1: Sector Heterogeneity in Effective Tax rates 
public administration 











production of  other transport 
cars 
opticals and clocks 
audio and television equipment 
electrical machines 
office supplies  _~ 
machines 








wood and cork  Ii 
leather and shoes 
clothing and furst  ~~~E~i~~~5i~~r:t::::t~~~J 
textiles 
to bacco  !@  ,  ' 
food products 
extraction of natural resouroes  ~T 
0,00  0,10  0,20  0,30  0,40  0,50 
IIJ mean etr1 
10 The complete list of  names, Nace-Bel codes and observations per sector is in the Appendix Table A.l. 9 
While  in  some  cases  the  below  average  ETR may be  a  reflection  of the  legal  tax 
facilities that firms  in these sectors enjoy, like in the case of the R&D-and recycling-
sector,  it  is  far  less  easy  to  explain  the  average  ETR  level  in  others  sectors.  One 
potential  explanation  is  that  the  government  through  the  tax  system  is  either 
encouraging or discouraging certain activities. Also, sectors in economic difficulty and 
subject to strong international competition like 'Metals' and 'Leather & shoes', seem to 
have  lower ETRs.  In the  regression analysis  in  section  6  we  will  include  33  sector 
dummies to control for sector effects in addition to  firm characteristics to explain the 
variation in firm level ETRs.  11 
5.  The Model and Variable Definitions 
The  empirical  model  we  introduce  in  this  section  closely  follows  the  literature 
(Huizinga  &  Nicodeme,  2003  and  Buijinck  et  aI.,  2000)  by  including  firm 
characteristics  and  sector  dummies  to  explain  firm  level  ETRs.  In  addition  to  this 
literature we also include year dummies, location dummies and legal tax facilities. The 
empirical specification we test has the following general form, 
ETRit =  fJo  + /31 FIRM  SIZEit + /32 LEGAL  it  +/34 REGIONi + 
/35  YEAR +/36 SECTORi + cit 
where the independent variable, ETR, is the effective tax rate of firm i in year t. 
(1) 
In the literature FIRM SIZE has predominantly been measured by the log of  total assets 
but has resulted in ambiguous signs as  argued by Gupta & Newberry (1997).  For this 
reason  we  also  proxy  firm  size  by  the  log  of total  employment  at  the  firm  level 
(EMPLOYM). We further include a set of variables accounting for  a number of legal 
tax breaks, such as capital intensity (CAP), Long term leverage (Ltleverage) and R&D 
expenses (R&Dintens). The capital intensity (CAP) of a company is defined as the ratio 
llWhile there are 34, 2-digit NACE-BEL sectors, in the regressions we drop the 'Optical & Clockworks'-
sector, because its ETR is exactly the average ETR across all  sectors, which can be seen from Figure  1. 
The  sector  dummies  therefore  reflect  a  lower  or  higher  ETR  vis-a-vis  the  sector  of 'Optical  and 
Clockworks' . 10 
of fixed tangible assets over total assets. This variable can affect ETR through the tax 
treatment  of depreciation  12  or  through  the  tax  breaks  for  investrnents. 13  Long-term 
leverage  is  defined as  the  ratio  of long-term  debt  over total  assets.  One  reason  for 
including this variable is that interest payments on debt are fully deductible as long as 
the creditor is a financial company institution (Vankerckhove and Heirewegh, 2003). As 
discussed above, there is also a tax facility for R&D investments and patents. This is the 
main  reason  for  including  the  R&Dintens  variable  which  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of 
intangible fixed assets over total assets.  14 
To control for regional differences in ETRs we include two regional dummies. One with 
a value of 1 if a firm belongs to Brussels and a 0 otherwise and one with a value of 1 if 
a  firm  belongs  to  Wallonia  and  a  zero  otherwise  (Flanders  is  the  counterfactual). 
Another variable controlling for location is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm 
belongs to a co-ordination center (COCEN).15 
To analyze the yearly evolution of ETRs over the period we  include 9 year dummies 
(yI994-y2002)  with  1993  as  the  reference  year.  Finally  to  control  for  sector 
heterogeneity  we  include  33  sector  dummies  at  two-digit  Nace-Bel  level.  We  also 
include an error term (Git )  to control for white noise. In the next section we report the 
results of an Ordinary Least squares (OLS) regression where we  take into account that 
firm observations in consecutive years are not independent observations. For this reason 
we  cluster  around  firm  observations.  This  renders  the  standard  errors  into  robust 
standard  errors.  As  a  robustness  check  in  section  7,  we  will  use  a  fixed  effects 
specification  where  we  allow  for  a  firm  specific  intercept.  This  implies  that  in 
expression (1),  f30  is  replaced by  f3i  where subscript i refers to an individual firm.  By 
including an intercept for each individual firm,  we implicitly control for firms specific 
factors  that are  unobservable  or not included in our analysis but that may affect the 
Effective tax rate and which is quite cornmon to  use in micro-econometrics using firm 
12 Depreciation is an expense of  the period and lowers the tax base. 
13  For energy saving investments the company can deduct 13.5% of the purchase value of the investment 
from the taxable income (Vankerckhove and Heirewegh, 2003). 
14  We have also experimented with including the AGE of a firm, but this variable never turned out to be 
significant and was therefore dropped from the analysis. 
15  Co-ordination  centers  are  locations  where  foreign  multinational  firms  that  engage  in  financial  or 
business support services get a much lower tax rate. 11 
level  data.  Examples  of firm  level  fixed  effects  are  the  ability  of the  manager,  the 
quality of  the auditor, the political clout of a firm etc. 
6. Empirical Results 
In this  section we  discuss our main results.  Table 4 reports the  main OLS  regression 
results for model (1), using all observations for the period 1993-2002.  In column (1) we 
use  the  logarithm  of total  assets  as  size  variable,  while  column  (2)  is  the  same 
regression but where we use the log of  employment as a proxy for firm size. 
Both firm size variables seem to have a positive effect on the ETR, indicating that larger 
firms pay higher taxes. This result has also been confirmed in other studies like Gupta 
& Newberry (1997) and Zimmerman (1983) for the US. 
All the  'LEGAL' variables corne with the expected sign. Highly leveraged firms with 
many interest expenses have lower ETRs, as well as firms that invest in R&D. Capital 
intensive firms have lower ETRs as a result of  higher depreciations. 
Also, we find evidence of regional tax competition. Both Brussels and the dummy for 
Wallonia are negative and significant, suggesting a lower average ETR in these regions 
than in Flanders.  Note  that  this  regional  difference  is  obtained  after  controlling  for 
sector composition and firm  characteristics which may be  different between the  two 
regions. The results in Table 4 also confirm that Multinationals in co-ordination centers 
have a lower ETR. 
The  year-dummies  we  included  are  all  positive  and  significant.  This  suggests  that 
corporate  tax burden has  been rising  since  1993.  The  coefficients  indicate  that  the 
strongest increase has occurred in the most recent years. A possible explanation is that 
the  tax  base  has  widened  gradually,  to  anticipate  the  large  reduction  in  STR  in 
December 2002 where Belgium reduced its STR to 33.99% from the fiscal year 2003 
onwards. 12 
Table 4: Regression Results 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
D~endent  var  etrl  etrl  etr2  etr2  etr2 
Assets  0.003*  - -0.002***  - -0.001 *** 
[0.002]  [0.003]  [0.002] 
Employm  - 0.016***  - 0.004  -
[0.002]  [0.003] 
Ltleverage  -0.007***  -O.OOS**  -0.0006  -0.0005  1.25e-06* 
[0.002]  [0.004]  [0.0006]  [0.001]  [7.3Se-07] 
Cap  -0.05*  -0.05*  -0.007*  -0.006*  -2.7e-06* 
[0.027]  [0.02S]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [1.62e-06] 
R&Dintens  -0.24***  -0.249***  -0.023***  -0.022***  -4.13e-06 
[0.03]  [0.036]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.00] 
Cocen  -0.123***  -0.14S***  -0.006***  -0.016***  -O.OOS*** 
[0.029]  [0.02S]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Brussels  -0.017***  -0.019***  0.0002  0.001  -0.0001 
[0.007]  [O.OOS]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Wallonia  -0.015**  -0.017***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
[0.007]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
YI994  0.014***  0.017***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
[0.006]  [0.006]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Y1995  0.014***  0.015***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003*** 
[0.006]  [0.006]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Y1996  O.OlS***  0.02***  0.003***  0.002***  0.003*** 
[0.006]  [0.006]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Y1997  0.02***  0.022***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004*** 
[0.006]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Y199S  0.02S***  0.02S***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006*** 
[0.006]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Y1999  0.037***  0.035***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007*** 
[0.006]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.009] 
Y2000  0.037***  0.034***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007*** 
[0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.009] 
Y2001  0.038***  0.035***  0.007***  0.006***  0.006*** 
[0.007]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Y2002  0.046***  0.042***  0.009***  0.007***  0.008*** 
[0.007]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Extr. nat. resource  0.009  0.003  -0.001  -0.005  -0.002 
[0.036]  [0.04]  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.005] 
Food products  -0.026  -0.044*  -0.003  -0.007*  -0.004 
[0.025]  [0.026]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Tobacco  0.179***  0.16***  0.049*  0.045*  0.04S* 
[0.026]  [0.026]  [0.025]  [0.025]  [0.025] 
Textiles  -0.063**  -0.OS4***  -0.009**  -0.012***  -0.01 *** 
[0.03]  [0.031]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Clothing & furst  -0.023  -0.046  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003 
[0.043]  [0.046]  [O.OOS]  [0.009]  [O.OOS] 
Leather & shoes  0.008  -O.OOS  -0.005  -0.009  -0.005 
[0.079]  [O.OSl]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Wood & cork  -0.023  -0.024  -0.016***  -0.017***  -0.015*** 
[0.03S]  [0.03S]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003] 
Paper  -0.012  -0.039  -0.003  -0.007  -0.004 
[0.034]  [0.034]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Publishing  -0.011  -0.025  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
[0.027]  [0.02S]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.004] 
Cokes  -0.OS3  -0.111*  -0.004  -0.014***  -0.008 
[0.059]  [0.062]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Chemicals  -0.005  -0.022  0.005  -4.65e-06  0.003 
[0.026]  [0.027]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Rubber  -0.037  -0.05S*  0.002  -0.001  0.001 
[0.02S]  [0.029]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Non-metal prod.  -0.036  -0.052*  -0.002  -0.005  -0.003 
[0.02S]  [0.029]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Metals  -0.094***  -0.114***  -O.OOS  -0.012***  -0.01 *** 
[0.032]  [0.034]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Prod. metal prod.  -0.017  -0.03  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002 
[0.027]  [0.02S]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Machines  -0.009  -0.02S  -0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
[0.027]  [0.02S]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Office supplies  0.007  -0.016  -0.003  -0.006  -0.003 
[0.053]  [0.053]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Elec. machines  0.024  -0.001  0.005  0.002  0.005 
[0.033]  [0.034]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Audio & tv equip.  -0.062*  -0.OS9**  0.003  -0.001  0.002 
[0.036]  [0.039]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.007] 13 
Cars  -0.021  -0.046  0.007  -0.004  -0.002 
[0.036]  [0.037]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.007] 
Prod. ot. transport  -0.049  -0.08  -0.001  -0.007  -0.002 
[0.058]  [0.058]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Furniture  0.011  -0.01  -0.003  -0.005  -0.003 
[0.033]  [0.034]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Recycling  -0.129***  -0.127***  -0.008  -0.009  -0.009 
[0.041]  [0.041]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Elec. gas & water  -0.065  -0.078  -0.002  -0.009  -0.006 
[0.059]  [0.063]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Construction  0.057***  0.048*  -0.006*  -0.008*  -0.005 
[0.026]  [0.026]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Car sales  0.021  0.014  0.0001  -0.001  0.001 
[0.023]  [0.024]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Hotels  -0.12***  -0.141 ***  -0.01 ***  -0.013***  -0.012*** 
[0.029]  [0.030]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Transportation  -0.02  -0.03  -0.008**  -0.01 ***  -0.008** 
[0.025]  [0.026]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.003] 
Telecom  -0.096**  -0.101 **  -0.003  -0.007  -0.007 
[0.046]  [0.048]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.007] 
IT  -0.013  -0.022  0.004  0.004  0.005 
[0.028]  [0.029]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
R&D  -0.119**  -0.141 ***  -0.015***  -0.018***  -0.017*** 
[0.057]  [0.057]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Real estate  -0.039*  -0.018  -0.007**  -0.005  -0.007** 
[0.023]  [0.025]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003] 
Pub!. admin.  -0.047*  -0.054*  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006 
[0.028]  [0.029]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Constant  0.228***  0.207***  0.039***  0.021 ***  0.029*** 
[0.028]  [0.250]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Observations  27290  25683  27290  25683  27246 
R2  4.46%  4.88%  3.82%  2.82%  2.67% 
F-statistic  13.55  14.28  9.69  8.10  8.46 
Prob>F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
note:  standard  errors  are  between  brackets;  *=  significance  level  at  10%,  **= 
significance level at 5%, ***= significance level at 1  % 
Some authors have used a  different definition of the  Effective Tax rate.  Huizinga & 
Nicodeme (2003) have used the ratio of 'Tax Expenses' over 'total Assets'. Columns 3 
and 4 of  Table 4 show the results of  model (1) where the use this definition ofETR. 
Most of  our results are robust to the use of ETR2 as a dependent variable. However, the 
dummy for Brussels turns insignificant, while the dummy for Wallonia continues to be 
negative and strongly significant. In our view ETR2 is somewhat less suited to capture 
the extent of tax facilities, since there is no direct link between a firm's total assets and 
the tax rate it is  subject to,  which is why our preferred specification remains the ones 
with ETRl  as  a  dependent variable.  Also the  use  of ETR2  can induce  endogeneity 
problems as many right hand side variables of the model specification in (1)  are  also 
scaled  by  total  assets.  The  appropriate  way  to  address  this  is  to  use  instruments, 
typically lagged by one year. Therefore we run one specification where we use lagged 
values of total assets in the  denominator for  the  right hand side  variables potentially 
causing  the  endogeneity  (CAP,  LTleverage,  R&Dintens).  The  results  are  shown  in 
column 5, but our main findings go through. 14 
7.  Robustness Check 
Table  5  reports  some  robustness  checks.  We  start  in  column  (1)  by reporting  the 
outcome of a dynamic specification where we include the lagged value of ETRI as  an 
additional  explanatory  variable  on  the  right  hand  side  to  control  for  potential 
autocorrelation. However, our main variables of interest namely the regional effects and 
the time  effects  remain intact.  In column (2)  of Table  5 we  report  the  results  of a 
censored tobit regression that takes into account that ETRI is a truncated variable.  16 
Another common way to control for outliers is where we cut-off all ETR observations 
larger or smaller than twice the standard deviation of the mean ETR. The results of  this 
regression are  shown in column 3 of Table  5 but our results remain qualitatively the 
same. 
In column (4) we control for carry-forwards of losses which applies under Belgian law, 
by including a variable (LOSS_I) to capture last year's losses. However, this variable is 
not significant in the regression and the other results go through. 
The results of a fixed effects estimation is reported in column (5).  Controlling for firm 
level fixed effects is  very common in micro-econometrics. These fixed effects control 
for  a number of unobservables at the firm level that may affect ETRs and that if not 
controlled for  may introduce  an  omitted variables bias.  The  fixed  effects  estimation 
does not change the simple OLS results. All the firm level variables, regional and year 
effects continue to  hold.  We also  experimented with a random effects model but the 
Hausman-test  decided  in  favour  of the  fixed  effects  model  as  the  most  preferred 
specification. The variables capturing the regional tax competition in Belgium continue 
to be negative but the significance for Wallonia is stronger than for Brussels. 
16 The distribution ofETRls is shown in Figure A.I in the Appendix. 15 
Table 5:  Robustness Checks 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent var  etrl  etrl  etrl  etrl  etrl  Etr1 
Etrl-1  0.545***  - - - - -
[0.007] 
Employm  0.008***  0.033***  0.009***  0.016***  0.022***  0.015*** 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.001] 
Ltleverage  -0.004  -0.016***  -0.002***  -0.008**  -0.002  -0.008*** 
[0.003]  [0.003]  [0.001]  [0.004]  [0.002]  [0.003] 
Cap  -0.025*  -0.083***  -0.043*  -0.047*  -0.01 *  -0.047* 
[0.015]  [0.006]  [0.024]  [0.028]  [0.005]  [0.027] 
R&D  -0.145***  -0.451 ***  -0.27***  -0.254***  -0.118***  -0.25*** 
[0.022]  [0.03]  [0.028]  [0.036]  [0.028]  [0.036] 
Cocen  -0.074***  -0.11 ***  -0.115***  -0.148***  - -0.147*** 
[0.015]  [0.025]  [0.021]  [0.027]  [0.027] 
Loss-1  - - - -0.001  - -
[0.005] 
Brussels  -0.003  -0.011 *  -0.02***  -0.004  - -0.003 
[0.005]  [0.06]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Wallonia  -0.007*  -0.025***  -0.014*  -0.016**  - -0.015*** 
[0.004]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Y1994  0.035***  0.026***  0.016***  0.016***  0.021 ***  -
[0.007]  [0.011]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Y1995  0.027***  0.024**  0.021 ***  0.015***  0.016***  -
[0.007]  [0.011]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Y1996  0.032***  0.032***  0.028***  0.02***  0.023***  -
[0.007]  [0.011]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Y1997  0.031 ***  0.036***  0.028***  0.023***  0.024***  -
[0.007]  [0.01 ]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.006] 
Y1998  0.033***  0.046***  0.040***  0.028***  0.022***  -
[0.010]  [0.010]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.005] 
Y1999  0.042***  0.058***  0.042***  0.036***  0.025***  -
[0.007]  [0.010]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.005] 
Y2000  0.036***  0.059***  0.042***  0.035***  0.021 ***  -
[0.007]  [0.01]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.006] 
Y2001  0.038***  0.063***  0.042***  0.036***  0.019***  -
[0.007]  [0.011]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.006] 
Y2002  0.036***  0.069***  0.042***  0.042***  0.02***  -
[0.007]  [0.011]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.006] 
Gov2  - - - - - 0.0l3*** 
[0.004] 
Gov3  - - - - - 0.028*** 
[0.005] 
Sector-dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Constant  0.074***  0.074***  0.175***  0.207***  0.156***  0.215*** 
[0.015]  [0.019]  [0.022]  [0.025]  [0.012]  [0.024] 
Observations  25683  26477  27162  25683  25683  25683 
R2  33.29%  6.01%  4.74%  4.88%  0.60%  4.8% 
F  -statistic  174.54  13.69  14.00  9.28  16.14 
note:  standard errors between brackets 
*= significance level at 10%, **= significance level at 5%, ***= significance level at 1  % 
And as a final robustness check, we introduce a specification where we replace the year 
dummies  by dummies  for  three  distinct periods  in Belgian politics.  While  both the 
periods '93-94 and '94-98 coincide with a federal coalition of Christian democrats and 
socialists, the last period '99-2002 coincides with a coalition of Liberal Democrats and 16 
socialists.  For  each of these  different  governments  we  introduce  a  separate  dummy 
labeled (Govl, Gov2, Gov3) with a value of 1 for years in power, and zero otherwise. 
The last column in Table 5 shows the results of  this specification where we dropped the 
first period dummy Govl, hence the coefficients on the two other dummies are relative 
to the first period in our data. Both Gov2 and Gov3 are positive and significant, with the 
magnitude of the Gov3  variable twice the size of the Gov2  dummy.  This implies that 
the  Effective  tax  burden  has  increased  most  under  the  last  legislation  of Liberal 
Democrats and Socialists, probably in anticipation of the large reduction in STR from 
2003 onwards. 
8.  Conclusion 
This paper is the first to investigate the determinants of Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) for 
Belgium using company level  data for  the period  1993-2002.  We  found  evidence  of 
regional tax competition between the Northern region and the  Southern region of the 
country, with lower average ETRs in Wallonia compared to  Flanders. In addition, we 
found that Effective tax rates for large Belgian companies have steadily increased over 
the period 1993-2002. A potential explanation for this is that the government anticipated 
the  large  reduction in the  statutory tax rate  in  December  2002,  when the  STR was 
reduced from 40.17% to  33.99%. By widening the tax base gradually the government 
may have ensured that the reduction in STR has had a lesser effect on the budgetary 
position. 
Our data consisted of large Belgian firms  all  subject to  the highest Statutory tax rate 
(STR)  of 40.17%.  However,  the  average  Effective  tax rates  (ETR)  which takes  into 
account the tax base, lies substantially below that and for the more than 12,000 firms in 
our sample averages around 26%.  Moreover, ETRs differ substantially between firms. 
Labour  intensive  firms  pay relatively more  taxes  than  capital  intensive  firms.  Also, 
capital structure and R&D-intensity strongly reduce the Effective tax rates. In terms of 
sectoral differences, we find the  'socially desirable sectors' like tourism, recycling and 
R&D to pay relatively than less socially desirable sectors like for instance the 'Tobacco' 
sector. 17 
References 
Baldwin  R.  and  P.  Krugman  (2002),  Agglomeration,  Integration  and  Tax 
Harmonization, NBER working paper n° 9290. 
Buijink, W., Janssen, B.  and Schols, Y.,  2002, Evidence of the Effect of domicile on 
Corporate Average Effective Tax Rates in the European Union, Journal of  International 
Accounting, Auditing & Taxation 11, 115-130 
Buijink, W., Janssen, B. and Schols, Y., 2000, 2, Effective Tax Rates for Medium-Sized 
Companies in the EU-countries, Research project for the Dutch Ministry of  Finance 
Callihan,  D.,  1994,  Corporate  Effective  Tax  Rates:  A  Synthesis  of the  Literature, 
Journal of  Accounting Literature 13, 1-43 
Collins, J.H.  and Shackelford, D.A., 2002, Do U.S. Multinationals Face Different Tax 
Burdens than do  Other Companies?, paper prepared for the NBER conference on Tax 
Policy and the Economy in Washington, D.C. on October 8 
Devereux,  M.P.,  Griffith  R.,  Klemm,  A.,  2002,  Can  International  Tax  Competition 
Explain Corporate Income Tax Reforms?, IFS working paper European Commission, 
1998, Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council meeting on 1 December  1997 concerning 
taxation policy, Official Journal of  the European Communities C2 6/1/98, 1-6 
Gupta,  S.  and  Newberry,  K.,  1997,  Determinants  of the  variability  in  Corporate 
Effective Tax Rates: Evidence from Longitudinal Data, Journal of Accounting  and 
Public Policy 16, 1-34 
Haskel,  J.,  Pereira,  S.,  Slaughter,  M.,  2002,  Does Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
Boost the Productivity of  Domestic Firms?,  working  paper  no.  452,  Queen  Mary 
University of  Londen 
Huizinga,  H.  and  Nicodeme  G.,  2003,  Foreign  Ownership  and  Corporate  Income 
Taxation: An Empirical Evaluation, CEPR Discussion Paper no.  3952 18 
Janssen, B., 2003, Empirical Evidence on Explicit and Implicit Corporate Tax Burdens, 
(doctoral dissertation, University Maastricht) 
Nicodeme,  Go,  2001,  Computing  Effective  Corporate  Tax  Rates:  Comparisons  and 
results, DG ECFIN economic paper no 153 
Nicodeme,  Go,  2002,  Sector  and  Size  Effects  on  Effective  Corporate  Taxation, 
DG  ECO  FIN paper, http://europaoeu.int/  comml  economy_finance 
Plateau,  So  and  Van  Herck,  So,  1996,  Handboek  Consolidatie  juridisch  en 
boekhoudtechnisch, (Acco, Leuven) 
Taillieu,  L.,  2002,  Vennootschapsbelasting  AJ  2002  Fiscaliteit  NU,  (Standaard 
Uitgeverij) 
Van Driessche, Ho, 2003, Economisch Zakboekje 2003, (cedoSamson) 
Van Kerchove, Wo, Heirewegh, Go, 2003, Praktisch vennootschapsbelasting, aanslagjaar 
2003, (de boeck,  Antwerpen) 
Vertonghen, Ro  and Lefebvre, Co, 2002, Vennootschapsboekhouden, (Acco, Leuven) 
Wet van 17 juli 1975 op de Boekhouding en de Jaarrekening van de ondememingen en 
uitvoeringsbesluiten, (Officieuze coordinatie) 
Zimmerman, 1, 1983, Taxes and Firm Size, Journal of  Accounting and Economics, vol. 
5,noo2,ppol19-149 19 
Appendix 
Table A.l: Sectors, 2-digit level 
Sector  Nace-Bel code  Observations 
extraction of  natural resources  10,11,12,13,14  1390 
food products  15  4770 
Tobacco  16  90 
Textiles  17  2140 
clothing and furst  18  540 
leather and shoes  19  50 
wood and cork  20  880 
Paper  21  1020 
Publishing  22  2480 
Cokes  23  190 
Chemicals  24  3180 
Rubber  25  1840 
non-metal minerals  26  2790 
Metals  27  1160 
production of  metal products  28  3550 
Machines  29  2660 
office supplies  30  200 
electrical machines  31  1140 
audio and television equipment  32  470 
opticals and clocks  33  470 
Cars  34  790 
production of  other transport means  35  300 
Furniture  36  1540 
Recycling  37  500 
Utilities  40,41  220 
Construction  45  7480 
car sales  50,51,52  37620 
Hotels  55  1300 
Transportation  60,61,62,63  9500 
Telecom  64  370 
IT  65,66,67,72  2280 
R&D  73  130 
real estate activities  70,71,74  24490 
public administration  75,85,90,91,92,93,99  3100 20 
Table A.2: Correlation Matrix 
ETRI  ETR2  ASSETS  EMPLOYMENT  LTleverage 
Wallonia  -0.028  -0.034  -0.032  0.008  -0.003 
Brussels  -0.02  0.002  0.044  -0.016  0.003 
Cocen  -0.046  -0.038  0.156  -0.015  -0.002 
R&Dintens  -0.078  -0.039  -0.095  -0.073  0.023 
CAP  -0.098  -0.081  -0.001  0.014  0.060 
LTleverage  -0.044  -0.023  -0.016  -0.029  1 
EMPLOYM  0.082  0.017  0.653  1  -0.029 
ASSETS  -0.015  -0.099  1  0.653  -0.016 
ETR2  0.45  1  -0.015  0.017  0.017 
CAP  R&D  Cocen  Brussels 
Wallonia  0.052  -0.008  -0.02  -0.274 
Brussels  -0.054  0.082  0.036  1 
Cocen  -0.044  -0.030  1  0.036 
R&Dintens  -0.049  1  -0.030  0.082 
CAP  1  -0.049  -0.044  -0.054 Table A.3: Data-Appendix 
ETRI  Corporate tax expenses! profit before taxes 
ETR2  Corporate tax expenses! total assets 
BRUSSELS  = 1 if in Brussels, =0  otherwise 
WALLONIA  = 1  if  in Wallonia, =0 otherwise 
ASSETS  log(total assets) 
EMPLOYM  loge employment) 
CAP  tangible fixed assets! total assets 
LTLEVERAGE  total L  T debt! total assets 
R&Dintens  Intangible fixed assets! total assets 
=1  if  coordination  centre  (Nace-Bel=74152),  =0 
COCEN  otherwise 
33  sector dummies at 2- digits Nace-Bel (=0 if optical 
SECTORS  and clocks sector) 
Y1994 - Y2002  9 Year dummies (=0 if 1993) 
Figure A.l: Kernel Density Estimates of  ETRI 
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